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In an attempt to rectify the dispersion of  the cultural rights presented in the various international instruments that recognise them and to make progress in an audacious formulation thereof, the Fribourg Group has been meticulously working for over a decade on outlining, updating and systemising said rights. The group is formed of  
a multinational team of  researchers, organised around the 
Interdisciplinary Institute for Ethics and Human Rights of  
the University of  Fribourg, under the mandate of  UNESCO. 
It is charged with drawing up a declaration of  cultural rights 
and its works have included the development of  a definitive 
definition of  said rights. The purpose of  this is to facilitate the 
inclusion of  those rights ‒with the greatest technical rigour‒ 
in international legal protection instruments and therefore, 
in accordance with the respective constitutional provisions, 
in the internal statutes of  the States who undersign them.  
Before addressing the possibility of  their affirmation 
as authentic subjective rights and as fundamental human 
rights, let us start by learning about the set of  rights which, 
according to the Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights, 
of  the 7th of  May 2007, form the category of  cultural 
rights. In said document, written by the group, the rights are 
systemised as follows:
Identity and Cultural Heritage
Everyone, alone or in community with others, has 
the right:
a. To choose and to have one’s cultural identity
respected, in the variety of  its different means of  expression. 
This right is exercised in the inter-connection with, in 
particular, the freedoms of  thought, conscience, religion, 
opinion and expression;
b. To know and to have one’s own culture respected
as well as those cultures that, in their diversity, make up the 
common heritage of  humanity. This implies in particular 
the right to knowledge about human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as these are values essential to this heritage;
c. To access, notably through the enjoyment of  the
rights to education and information, cultural heritages that 
constitute the expression of  different cultures as well as 
resources for both present and future generations.
Cultural communities
a. Everyone is free to choose to identify or not to
identify with one or several cultural communities, regardless 
of  frontiers, and to modify such a choice;
b. No one shall have a cultural identity imposed or
be assimilated into a cultural community against one’s will.
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Access to and participation in cultural life
a. Everyone, alone or in community with others, 
has the right to access and participate freely in cultural life 
through the activities of  one’s choice, regardless of  frontiers.
b. This right includes in particular:
The freedom to express oneself, in public or in private 
in the language(s) of  one’s choice;
The freedom to exercise, in conformity with the rights 
recognised in the present Declaration, one’s own cultural 
practices and to follow a way of  life associated with the 
promotion of  one’s cultural resources, notably in the area of  
the use of  and in the production of  goods and services; 
The freedom to develop and share knowledge and 
cultural expressions, to conduct research and to participate 
in different forms of  creation as well as to benefit from these;
The right to the protection of  the moral and material 
interests linked to the works that result from one’s cultural 
activity.
Education and training
Within the general framework of  the right to 
education, everyone has the right throughout one’s lifespan, 
alone or in community with others, to education and 
training that, responding to fundamental educational needs, 
contribute to the free and full development of  one’s cultural 
identity while respecting the rights of  others and cultural 
diversity. This right includes in particular:
a. Human rights education and knowledge;
b. The freedom to teach and to receive teaching of  
and in one’s language and in other languages, as well as 
knowledge related to one’s own culture and other cultures;
c. The freedom of  parents to ensure the religious and 
moral education of  their children in conformity with their 
own convictions while respecting the freedom of  thought, 
conscience and religion of  the child on the basis of  her/his 
capacities;
d. The freedom to establish, to direct and to have 
access to educational institutions other than those run by the 
public authorities, on the condition that the internationally-
recognised norms and principles in the area of  education 
are respected and that these institutions conform to the 
minimum rules prescribed by the State.
Communication and information
Within the general framework of  the rights to freedom 
of  expression, including artistic freedom, as well as freedom of  
opinion and information, and with respect for cultural diversity, 
everyone, alone or in community with others, has the right 
to free and pluralistic information that contributes to the full 
development of  one’s cultural identity. This right, which may be 
exercised regardless of  frontiers, comprises in particular:
a. The freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information;
b. The right to participate in pluralist information, 
in the language(s) of  one’s choice, to contribute to its 
production or its dissemination by way of  all information 
and communication technologies;
c. The right to respond to erroneous information 
concerning cultures, with full respect of  the rights expressed 
in this Declaration. 
Cultural cooperation
Everyone, alone or in community with others, has the 
right to participate, according to democratic procedures:
In the cultural development of  the communities of  
which one is a member;
In the elaboration, implementation and evaluation of  
decisions that concern oneself  and which have an impact on 
the exercise of  one’s cultural rights;
In the development of  cultural cooperation at 
different levels.
The Fribourg Declaration brings together and clarifies 
rights that have already been recognised, albeit diffusely, in 
numerous international instruments and, as it justifies in 
its own text, it responds to the need “to show the crucial 
importance of  these cultural rights as well as the cultural 
dimension of  other human rights”. 
Indeed, the rights outlined, systemised and updated 
therein are already recognised, on the one hand, in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, on 
the other, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, both adopted by the General Assembly 
of  the United Nations in Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of  the 
16th of  December 1966. In turn, these have roots in the 
process which lead to the United Nations’ plenary approval 
of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights on the 10th 
of  December 1948.
Up until the final writing of  said Declaration, the 
Fribourg Group continued to classify the cultural rights 
recognised in the various existing international instruments 
as follows: rights recognised as cultural rights; the recognised 
rights of  those dedicated to the field of  culture; and the 
cultural dimension of  civil and political rights.
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The rights recognised as cultural rights by international 
instruments include the following: the right to participate 
in the cultural life of  the community and the protection of  
intellectual property of  creations and copyrights (recognised 
in Article 27 of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 
and Article 15 of  the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights); the right to education (Article 
26 of  the UDHR and Articles 13 and 14 of  the ICESCR); 
and the linguistic freedoms recognised for those belonging to 
a minority (Article 27 of  the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights).
The rights recognised for professionals of  culture 
include academic freedoms, the rights of  teachers and 
journalists (said rights cannot be denied their definition as 
human rights because they lack the necessary characteristic 
of  being universal, given that they allow and necessitate an 
interpretation using universal logic, seeing as anyone can be 
an author, teacher or journalist and must therefore have said 
rights).
The cultural dimension of  civil rights obligates the 
outlining of, among others, the right to dignity and non-
discrimination (right to the respect of  cultural identities); the 
freedoms of  thought, conscience and religion; the freedoms 
of  opinion, expression (right to information) and association 
(the right to belong or not to a cultural community).
Similarly, the table of  cultural rights produced by the 
Fribourg Group was based on the international agreements 
which covered said rights, either through their express 
formulation or in a more fragmented way. It began with 
the delimitation of  nine rights or groups of  rights which, 
depending on the fields to which they referred, could be 
grouped around three poles: creation, communication and 
identity. The political dimension had to be added to each one.
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Therefore, in terms of  creativity and creation, 
they included the freedoms of  investigation, creation and 
copyrights, as well as linguistic freedoms. The legal support 
for these included Articles 27 of  the UDHR, Article 15 of  
the ICESCR, the United Nations Declaration on Minorities 
and numerous sectoral instruments.
In terms of  expression and communication, included 
were the right to an education and permanent training, the 
right to adequate information and the right to participate in 
cultural heritage. Their legal support was found in Article 26 
of  the UDHR, Articles 13 and 14 of  the ICESCR and 19 of  
the UDHR, and Articles 19 and 27 of  the ICCPR.
As regards identity, included was to the right to freely 
choose and have one’s cultural identity respected in the variety 
of  its different means of  expression; the right to know about 
and have one’s own culture respected in its diversity; and the 
freedom to identify or not identify with a cultural community. 
The legal framework of  these rights is fragmented due to 
their recognition within civil rights (ICCPR - Articles 17, 18, 
22 and 27) and in the UN Declaration on Minorities, vis-à-vis 
the right to non-discrimination and freedom of  association.
Lastly, there was a need to include the right to 
participate in cultural policies in all fields specific to the 
previously listed rights (Articles 21 to 27 of  the UDHR, 
Articles 25 to 27 of  the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the United 
Nations’ Declaration on Minorities).
In Europe, a highly relevant legal text is the Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, which is the 
result of  the work carried out in the European Convention 
between the 26th of  February 2002 and the 8th of  July 2003. 
It refers to rights as deep-rooted as those linked to the arts, 
whether these are rights or freedoms; to scientific research 
(II-13); freedom of  thought, conscience and religion (Article 
II-10), the right to education (II-14); human dignity (I-1); and 
freedom of  expression (II-11), etc.
On another level, the Charter obliges the Union to 
protect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (III-22), a 
new aspect that should be especially highlighted due to its 
connection with cultural rights.
If  the Union undertakes to protect cultural diversity, 
this provision must be understood, pursuant to the relevant 
international texts, particularly UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity and Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of  the Diversity of  Cultural 
Expressions, as an acceptance of  the obligation to protect 
cultural rights within the European Community, with human 
rights being the guarantors of  cultural diversity.
With the protection of  cultural diversity we are 
protecting cultural rights, imposing a cultural based reading 
of  the entire set of  public rights and freedoms recognised on 
a European level1.
Lastly, we must cite another very valuable instrument 
for the recognition of  economic, social and cultural rights 
which is associated with the Organisation of  American States 
(OAS): the Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of  Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of  San Salvador, 
which was approved by the General Assembly of  the OAS 
in November 1988. Said protocol fully recognises the right to 
education (Article 13) and the right to the benefits of  culture 
(Article 14).
Of  crucial importance on the African continent is the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This was 
adopted on the 27th of  July 1981, during the 18th Assembly 
of  Heads of  State and Government of  the Organisation of  
Africa Unity which met in Nairobi, Kenya and it has been 
in force since October 1986. Article 17 thereof  recognises 
the right of  every individual to education, the right to freely 
take part in the cultural life of  one’s community and that 
the promotion and protection of  morals and traditional 
values recognized by the community shall be the duty of  
the State. 
Additionally, Article 22 establishes: “1. All peoples 
shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and 
in the equal enjoyment of  the common heritage of  mankind. 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to 
ensure the exercise of  the right to development.”
Articles 25 and 26 respectively state that: “State 
Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote 
and ensure through teaching, education and publication, 
the respect of  the rights and freedoms contained in the 
present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and 
rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are 
understood” and that said states shall have the duty “to 
guarantee the independence of  the Courts and shall allow 
the establishment and improvement of  appropriate national 
institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of  
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter”.
Collective and identifying rights
The preamble of  the Fribourg Declaration reads as 
follows: “Observing that cultural rights have been asserted 
primarily in the context of  the rights of  minorities and 
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indigenous peoples and that it is essential to guarantee these 
rights in a universal manner, notably for the most destitute.”
Since 1969, the UN’s Declaration on the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination has promoted universal 
and effective respect for human rights and fundamental 
liberties, condemning the practices of  segregation and 
discrimination. 
The International Labour Organisation’s Convention 
1692 (approved by Law 24.071 of  1992) sustains that “in 
many parts of  the world these peoples are unable to enjoy 
their fundamental human rights to the same degree as the 
rest of  the population of  the States within which they live, 
and that their laws, values, customs and perspectives have 
often been eroded.” It also reminds us of  “the distinctive 
contributions of  indigenous and tribal peoples to the cultural 
diversity and social and ecological harmony of  humankind 
and to international co-operation and understanding.” It 
affirms the States’ obligations to recognise and protect the 
social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of  
said people; to respect the integrity of  their values, practices 
and institutions; to promote their participation in decisions 
about their priorities; to protect the environment of  the 
territories in which they live; and to take into consideration 
their common law when applying legislation. Said 1989 
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, in terms of  the possession of  the 
lands traditionally inhabited by said communities, establishes 
a concept of  territory “which covers the total environment of  
the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise 
use” and obligates the protection of  the natural resources 
that exist therein. The convention covers, among other 
things, matters of  great interest related to cooperation across 
frontiers, thus recognising the situation of  numerous peoples 
settled in territories that extend across national borders. This 
includes Andean peoples such as the Aymara people living 
in Peru, Bolivia and Chile and the Quechua who populate 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil.
In its General Conference in October 2005, UNESCO 
presented for approval the Convention for the Protection 
and Promotion of  the Diversity of  Cultural Expressions, an 
international, legally binding agreement which guarantees 
that artists, professionals and other stakeholders of  culture, 
along with citizens all over the world, can create, produce, 
publish and enjoy a wide range of  cultural goods, services 
and activities, including their own. It was adopted because 
the international community understood the urgency of  
the need to apply international regulations which would 
recognise, on the one hand, the distinctive character of  
cultural goods, services and activities as vectors for the 
transmission of  identity, values and meanings; and on the 
other hand, that these cultural goods, services and activities 
are not merely merchandise or consumer goods that can only 
be considered as objects of  commerce, even if  they do have a 
significant economic value
The Convention rests on the assumption that cultural 
diversity is an item of  world heritage that must be treasured 
and preserved because it increases human possibilities, 
capacities and values, within a framework of  democracy, 
tolerance, social justice and mutual respect between 
peoples and cultures. It highlights the importance of  the 
knowledge systems of  native peoples and their contribution 
to sustainable development, as well as the need to guarantee 
their protection and promotion. It affirms that cultural 
activities, goods and services must not be only considered for 
their commercial value but that they have value of  a cultural 
nature. It is therefore differentiated from the position of  the 
United States, Australian and Japanese governments who 
believed it took a protectionist position and who were, until 
very recently, in favour of  the absolute application of  free 
exchange (Mattelart, A. 2005) as regards all products and 
services. 
According to the United Nations’ Declaration on 
the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples of  the 13th of  September 
2007, the right to cultural identity and integrity is inherent 
in the right of  indigenous people to determine and protect 
the system of  culture and values by which they want to live, 
not suffering forced assimilation or the destruction of  said 
culture.
In this respect, the right to cultural identity entails 
the effective and real possibility of  indigenous peoples 
remaining and perpetuating as distinct peoples. The right 
to cultural identity and integrity supposes the protection of  
their customs and traditions, their institutions and common 
laws, the ways in which they use their land, their forms of  
social organisation, and their social and cultural identity. 
States must recognise and respect cultural identity and they 
must consult indigenous peoples before adopting measures 
or projects that may affect them.
The nature, scope and entitlement of  these rights are, 
however, controversial.
When the crisis situation of  a current state is 
undeniable – it being subject to cultural, economic, financial, 
migratory and other types of  tensions and with globalisation 
revealing its fragility and insufficiency as a political body that 
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should be capable of  responding to emerging needs of  any 
sort – the affirmation of  the existence of  collective rights 
and traits and the scope that these are attributed will depend 
on the legal response that is given to the complex situations 
which cultural pluralism generates. 
In short, beyond the postulates defended under one 
stance or another, the debate underlying this controversy is 
whether all cultures are of  equal value and whether states 
(and the politico-administrative units into which they are 
organised) have the capacity to organise themselves so as to 
integrate the various cultures that may reside in their territory 
and to give satisfactory responses to the legitimate aspirations 
of  their respective members and citizens.
As Pérez de la Fuente3 cited from Parekh’s 
work Political Theory and the Multicultural Society: 
“Contemporary multicultural societies have emerged against 
the background of  nearly three centuries of  the culturally 
homogenizing nation-state. As a territorially constituted 
entity, the modern state accommodated territorial but not 
cultural decentralization. Since the state required cultural 
and social homogenization as its necessary basis, it has for 
nearly three centuries sought to mould the wider society in 
that direction. Thanks to this, we have become accustomed 
to equating unity with homogeneity, and equality with 
uniformity.”
The same author, in his work Cultural Pluralism and 
the Rights of  Minorities explains how “the consensus on 
cultural values which nations suppose is a pre-political link 
of  the State which assumes the homogeneity which drowns 
difference” is now on another level and contrasts “the 
egalitarian liberal position” with multiculturalism. Thus, 
this “affirms a consensus on procedural values stemming 
from the public sphere and considers cultures to be part 
of  the private sphere” and proclaims that a state’s claimed 
cultural neutrality “does not exist.” This is because “in order 
to articulate the public sphere, it must unavoidably make 
decisions that affect symbols, official languages, education 
and culture in which the nation’s homogenous pre-political 
link is revealed.” Liberalism deems it enough to bear in 
mind, within these decisions, the pluralism of  the existing 
national and cultural groups in a state, without articulating 
their forms of  participation or greater recognition.
In turn, multiculturalism affirms that not even 
consensus on procedural values of  the public sphere is 
culturally neutral. “The role of  the State is not to privatise 
cultures, but rather to promote and accommodate the cultural 
diversity that it believes is enriching and inescapable4”. 
Therefore, liberalism recognises the need to protect 
the cultural contexts in which individuals function only insofar 
as said protection guarantees said individuals’ autonomy and 
freedom of  choice; multiculturalism advocates the protection 
and promotion of  the different cultures which form the 
identity of  the individuals. 
It is clear from these points alone that the discussion 
of  collective rights is a debate loaded with presuppositions. 
The prior implications of  each of  the positions entail an 
entire series of  very deep theoretical assumptions.
Each of  the positions adopted by the authors of  
scientific doctrine, by the constitutional texts of  states and 
of  regional integration movements, by state legislations, 
and by the public policies accepted by national, territorial 
or local governments, etc. all stem from a different idea 
of  how to address, understand and tackle the unstoppable 
phenomenon of  cultural pluralism: by assimilating difference 
or by integrating it.
To include diverse cultural communities and 
identities within a political entity, whether this is a state 
entity or a political-administrative one, and to preserve said 
entity, one can opt for assimilation (which is almost always 
unsustainable) or for recognising certain rights. These can be 
those of  the individuals of  said communities or those of  the 
collectives into which they are integrated, defining the latter 
by shared cultural traits that are distinct from those of  the 
initial community.
By way of  a very brief  summary of  Pérez de la 
Fuente5 ‒against the affirmation of  collective rights are 
those who defend the following four theories: 1) The 
individualist theory which, in ethical, ontological, semantic 
and methodological terms, states that all intelligence and 
social interest, and consequentially legal interest, resides 
in the individual in such a way that only individuals can 
exercise rights and freedoms. 2) The legal theory which 
imposes the rigorous observance of  the laws which 
govern all attribution of  rights within the legal systems. 
This collides with the difficulty of  determining, with the 
necessary legal security, who is entitled to collective rights 
and it also collides with a collective subject’s need, in order 
to exercise rights, to have established mechanisms for 
representation, decision-making and the assumption of  
collective responsibility. 3) The redundancy theory, which 
maintains that collective rights make individual rights 
redundant, seeing as they respond to the situations which 
take place in all multicultural societies. 4) The risks theory, 
which accentuates the disadvantages and damaging or 
103
104
malign effects resulting from the affirmation of  collective 
rights, compared to the solutions which its adoption 
provides. 
Included in those who favour collective rights are 
those who adopt one of  the following: 1) The social theory, 
which affirms the necessity to provide protection to the 
socio-cultural context in which people function, seeing as 
it is the only framework within which it is possible to fully 
develop specifically human potentials. 2) The collectivist 
theory which, beyond the foregoing, believes that there is 
intrinsic value in collectives, a moral asset which in itself  
needs to be protected over the individual rights afforded to 
their members. 3) The political theory, which is based on 
the need to recognise collective rights due to political and 
social reasons, so that collectives are called on to correct and 
improve the justified demands of  those to whom individual 
rights do not apply. 4) The precision theory, which deems 
that if  the measures claimed as collective rights are precisely 
defined then there is nothing impeding their recognition, 
seeing as they are outlined as rights based on a group6. 
Thusly, standpoints of  a liberal nature deny the very 
existence of  collective rights. Let us assume that the existence 
of  society is the natural result of  man’s social dimension, 
seeing as human beings are only fully realised in the 
framework of  society, and let us admit that individual identity 
is always necessarily social identity, seeing as human beings 
exist within a particular social group and are supported by 
said group (with this supposing, among other things, the 
sharing of  certain cultural traits). Therefore, in order for an 
individual to develop properly7, it is of  basic importance to 
afford them all rights, whether these are cultural or of  any 
other nature, as only that individual can recognise human 
dignity, the source of  the right to one’s own cultural identity.
Even when admitting that “the full definition of  
individual identity always encompasses the reference to the 
community which defines it,8” one is denying the possibility 
that the cultural community to which it belongs is personified 
and therefore recognised as entitled to rights and the subject 
of  protection and guardianship in itself  and by itself.
As indicated by Lamo de Espinosa, among others: “At 
the moment when man is conceived as a ‘being of  culture’, 
‘zoon politikon’, a social animal by nature, respect for the 
individual cannot cease to encompass respect for the culture 
which forms him.”
This thesis does not consist of  affirming that, given 
the existence of  different cultural groups and the belonging 
of  humankind to those groups, there is an inferred duty to 
respect those diverse cultures; instead, it maintains that, 
given that human beings are only fully realised within the 
framework of  a social group and given the insistence on 
unconditional respect for humans, all humans have an 
inferred right to the protection of  the culture of  the social 
group to which they belong9. 
According to these authors, there is no “ethical or 
legal duty to protect traditional cultures other than to the 
extent and in the way in which said traditions are shared by 
the members of  the social group.”
Faced with the difficulties of  rigorously attributing 
collective rights to groups and communities whose members 
may be unaware of  the bodies (which in turn may also be 
non-existent) through which they can exercise the group’s 
recognised rights, this standpoint believes that the decisive 
factor is the protection of  the individuals who make up this 
minority. This protection covers their basic rights, including the 
right to conserve their cultural traits. The standpoint is aware 
that the attribution of  collective rights is not necessary to the 
provision of  adequate protection to social groups, especially 
minorities, and postulates that: “In short, the protection of  a 
minority is covered by two complementary paths of  action: 
on the one hand, by ensuring equality between the rights of  
the individuals belonging to the minority and those of  the 
majority group; and on the other, by protecting the difference, 
i.e. adequately safeguarding the specific cultural idiosyncrasies 
of  the minority group. Well, in both cases we are faced with a 
problem of  protecting individual rights.10”
Unlike this individualist liberal position, the defenders 
of  the communitarianist social standpoint even affirm 
collective rights as fundamental rights to which certain 
groups of  people are entitled. 
Beyond that, a more ambitious position is that 
manifested in the preamble of  the Fribourg Declaration which 
affirms that “it is essential to guarantee them universally,” in 
such as way that they can be affirmed as universal human 
rights. By definition, the latter must be recognised for 
everybody, whether or not they are in a cultural minority, i.e.: 
said rights must be recognised as universal rights, for every 
human being, insofar as they are all likely to be found in any 
of  the situations to which they refer. 
In the words of  Prieto de Pedro, Ibero-American 
constitutionalism and the Constitutions of  Latin America 
have: “in recent years, made extraordinary progress in the 
recognition of  cultural rights for creative development. 
Currently, they represent the most important cultural rights 
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breeding ground or nursery that exists within recent world 
constitutionalism”. Given the growing sectors of  both 
scientific and legal doctrine and a thriving constitutional 
jurisprudence coming from the state and regional courts and 
tribunals which have decisively approved various collective 
rights, affirming the need to recognise these collective rights 
and ‘third generation’ human rights, we will now study this 
concept and its implications.
The expression ‘cultural rights’ designates the right of  
people within all human communities to a cultural, collective 
and historic identity and to pursue their own development.
It includes the right of  all communities to freely 
determine their relations with other social and/or political 
communities, in a spirit of  coexistence, dialogue, mutual 
benefit and respect. They also have the right to determine 
their own political condition and to freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.
They can preserve their own institutions, enjoy 
recognition and have the freedom to preserve and strengthen 
their own political, legal, economic, social and cultural 
institutions, whilst also maintaining the right to participate, if  
they so desire, in the political, economic, social and cultural 
life of  the states and political entities in which they live.
The recognition and exercise of  collective rights 
involves cohabitation within the framework of  diversity of  
nationalities and peoples, respecting and recognising the 
following aspects of  said communities: 
Their territoriality:
Participation in the use and administration of  the 
natural resources, such as water, forests, etc., that are found 
in indigenous territories.
Consultation with indigenous peoples for the 
exploitation of  natural resources such as mines, oil, etc.
The compensation of  communities of  inhabitants 
for damages caused to nature by the exploitation of  their 
resources.
Conservation of  the ownership of  community lands.
Conservation of  their cultural identity:
Having bilingual, intercultural education systems.
The right to use one’s mother tongue.
Collective intellectual ownership of  their knowledge.
The practice of  ancestral and alternative medicine.
The use of  one’s traditional clothing and symbols of  
identity.
The conservation of  their sacred places and rituals.
The use of  their own forms of  organisation:
The conservation and generation of  their forms 
of  social organisation and the strengthening of  local and 
community governments.
The exercise of  the administration of  justice within 
their communities.
The participation of  their representatives in the state 
bodies in whose territory they are living. 
“If  freedom was the guiding value of  first generation 
rights, as equality was for economic, social and cultural 
rights, the main value of  reference in third generation rights 
is solidarity”11.
Therefore, collective rights are part of  the so-called 
third generation rights, the international recognition of  
which was historically subsequent to that of  civil and political 
rights (first generation) and economic, social and cultural 
rights (second generation). 
Some of  the rights of  this third generation are rights 
to sustainable development, peace, artistic and cultural 
heritage, one’s own cultural identity (especially that of  
indigenous people), a healthy environment, and consumer 
rights. 
For example, the current Constitution of  Ecuador, 
from 2008, recognises the following as collective rights: 
environmental rights, those of  the indigenous communities 
who live in the country and those of  consumers. Said 
constitution recognises indigenous peoples’ collective rights 
to their cultural identity, property, participation, bilingual 
education and traditional medicine, among others. These 
rights are extended, as applicable, to black and Afro-
Ecuadorian peoples. Said constitution also recognises the 
entire population’s right to a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment, as well as reparations and compensation for 
consumers affected by harmful products or actions, whether 
from public or private actors. The Bolivian Constitution 
(approved by Law 1615 of  the 6th of  February 1995), the 
Constitution of  the United Mexican States (updated by the 
reform of  the 14th of  August 2001), and the Constitution of  
Paraguay of  the 20th of  June 1992, etc. all follow the same 
lines.
As explained by Professor Grijalva12, third generation 
rights and therefore collective rights serve to complement 
those of  the two previous generations as regards references 
to the creation of  specific conditions for the exercise thereof. 
Thus, the third generation right to development creates the 
conditions for the effective exercise of  the second generation 
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right to work. Similarly, the third generation right to a 
healthy environment is a necessary condition to exercise 
first generation rights such as the right to life or to physical 
integrity.
Without ever affirming their universal nature, 
said author, along with many others who subscribe to a 
communitarianist position, distinguish between the collective 
rights to which all human beings are entitled and which are 
therefore universal, and those which must be recognised only 
for certain groups or communities of  people, it being more or 
less possible to determine who may exercise them and who is 
affected by their violation. Thusly, the third generation rights 
to development and peace belong to the former, universal 
category, seeing as they are diffuse rights “the violation of  
which affects us all, although it is impossible to determine 
who specifically. In contrast, collective rights tend to refer 
to more specific groups. The collective rights of  indigenous 
peoples are tailored to those within that category. The 
collective rights of  consumers and to a healthy environment 
can be diffuse but in terms of  it being determinable who is 
affected by a certain violation thereof, they fit the concept of  
collective rights better. Of  course, the determination of  the 
specific group affected is not always easy or possible.”
Following said author’s reasoning, which is shared by 
a broad doctrinal current: collective rights are diverse but 
not contrary to individual human rights. In fact, collective 
rights include individual rights as regards the corresponding 
human groups which are entitled to them and in that they 
create the conditions for the exercise of  individual rights. 
For example, the collective rights of  indigenous peoples 
implicate and protect each person’s individual right to 
culture. The collective right to a healthy environment covers 
both the health of  the community and that of  each of  
the individuals who form it. However, collective rights are 
indivisible: they are the rights of  the group and of  each one 
of  its individual members, but never just one or some of  
them, with abstraction from the group. 
Based on this idea, collective rights complement 
individual rights even though they may collide with them and, 
due to the fact that they do not claim a universal character, 
they can infringe on the principle of  equality. This is the case, 
for example, of  the conflict between the right of  indigenous 
communities to maintain their own forms of  administering 
justice, which can sometimes include punishing offenders 
physically, thus violating said person’s individual right to 
physical integrity. In cases such as this, numerous authors 
refute the admissibility of  these community practices when 
they are an affront to the individual human rights on which 
human dignity is founded, meaning that collective rights 
could never cover such practices. 
According to Professor Peces-Barba, “Universality 
must be the destination point of  economic, social and cultural 
rights and it is closely related to the principle of  equality. In 
other words, it can only be reached if  one starts with the 
basis that inequalities exist and by that virtue those who are 
not equal should not get treated equally. Special protection 
should be afforded to those who are worth protecting due 
to their unique conditions, in such a way that rights become 
truly universal.13”
Along the same lines, Professor Prieto de Pedro 
affirms: “Cultural rights are and should be seen as rights for 
all groups and human beings, independently of  the different 
level of  realisation that some and others have achieved. If  
we do not take this conceptual step, it is impossible for us to 
be able to speak of  cultural rights as universal rights and to 
consider them as a subsystem of  fundamental rights (within 
which we find political, economic, social and cultural rights). 
In both cultural rights and fundamental rights, there 
is a clear double dimension, individual and collective, given 
One of the defining 
characteristics of the model 
of collective rights is that 
they cannot be reduced to 
individual rights, situating 
them in a panorama in which 
there may be overlaps, 
contradictions and tensions 
between the two levels.
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that an individual is not an atom isolated from all others. If  
that were so, it would wither or be denatured. In contrast, its 
self  is constructed from its interaction with other equal beings. 
Sociability is a presupposition of  human existence, or as the 
poet Antonio Machado said: ‘A solitary heart is not a heart.’ 
This sociability functions within a range of  options 
in terms of  groups. On the one hand are sporadic groups, 
those which may come together at a football match or in the 
theatre; then there are secondary stable groups, represented 
by associations, political parties, neighbours; and lastly there 
are structural stable groups, legacies of  the past, such as 
nations, municipalities or ethnic and cultural communities.
These realties must be addressed in different ways 
in terms of  cultural rights. It needs to be understood that 
collective rights do not equate to the sum of  the individual 
rights of  the group, as maintained by liberalism, but actually 
involve much more. These groups are carriers of  symbolic 
universes of  the set of  their members and they generate 
identity as the repertoire of  shared feeling.
These collective values are constituted by legal 
assets that must be protected. The guarantees of  protecting 
collective rights are a response to different guarantees which, 
in some cases, convert the protection of  collective rights into 
something like a compartment made by a town planning 
department. This process is carried out via the system of  
personal autonomy (little used) or else that of  territorial 
autonomy (the most common system), giving rise to the 
different forms of  statehood (federal, regional or atypical) 
which recognise different fields of  territorial autonomy. 
Powers of  self-government are exercised autonomously 
within these fields by certain population groups, defined 
precisely by said cultural difference.
Furthermore, there is also the institutional guarantee. 
In this respect, it is illustrative to cite the case of  language. 
When a group has its own language within a wider 
population, there is an individual dimension in the right that 
gives individuals the option to choose the way in which they 
express themselves - their language. Likewise, the collective 
freedom as regards the use of  that language does not equate 
to the sum of  the individual freedoms of  all citizens. If  the 
public powers have no action that would institutionalise said 
group’s language as official, it will not be possible to create 
the collective right.14”
From this standpoint, it therefore becomes necessary 
to affirm the universality of  collective rights and to make 
progress in the necessary and solid articulation of  their 
individual and collective dimensions. If  not, they could come 
into conflict when the selfsame system of  collective rights 
does not anticipate how to resolve the prevalence of  one case 
over another.
“One of  the defining characteristics of  the models of  
collective rights is that they cannot be reduced to individual 
rights, situating them in a panorama in which there may be 
overlaps, contradictions and tensions between the two levels. 
Therefore, mechanisms must be formulated for the resolution 
of  conflicts between individual rights and collective rights. 
This is a return back to the consideration of  the philosophical 
debates over whether the individual is predominant or 
whether the context into which the individual is inserted is 
predominant.  (...)
The theories in favour of  collective rights wish to 
rebuild the relations between collective rights and individual 
rights so that they are harmonious, but they refrain from 
presenting them as necessarily conflictive. Indeed, it is 
believed that collective rights are a precondition for the 
exercise of  individual rights and therefore the former cannot 
contradict the latter. Individual rights are only effective with 
the prior existence and effectiveness of  collective rights.15”
With this in mind, Escudero Alday summarises this 
position by affirming: “It is the very protection of  individual 
rights which ultimately necessitates the presence of  rights of  
collective entitlement.” He underlines that: “the relationship 
between rights of  individual entitlement and collective 
entitlement must not be understood in exclusive terms, nor 
as if  they were part of  a sort of  hierarchical order.16”
As criteria for resolving cases of  conflict between 
individual rights and collective rights, the social theory only 
considers the legitimacy of  the protection of  the groups who 
promote significant autonomous elections, and not those 
which use internal restrictions to encourage the internal 
coherence of  the group to the detriment of  the individual, 
making use of  closed ideologies. As regards the liberal 
ideology, in a not dissimilar manner, the human dignity of  
the individual always operates as a limit.
To conclude this chapter, an example of  this can 
be found in the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights, 
specifically the Case of  the Kichwa Indigenous People of  
Sarayaku vs. Ecuador considered that “the right to cultural 
identity is a fundamental right – and one of  a collective 
nature – of  the indigenous communities, which should be 
respected in a multicultural, pluralistic and democratic 
society.17” This means that States are obliged to duly consult 
the communities settled in their territory about matters 
which affect or may affect their cultural and social life, in 
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accordance with their values, traditions, customs and forms 
of  organisation.
Cultural Rights and Human Rights
Having outlined the rights that could be considered 
as cultural, we shall now address their nature. Can we affirm 
them as fundamental human rights? Do they constitute 
authentic subjective rights and should they therefore benefit 
from the integrity of  the guarantees that the legal system 
(internal and international) provides to ensure their exercise 
and justiciability, as it does in the case of  other human rights?
As Professor Prieto de Pedro repeatedly reiterates, the 
historic process which gave rise to the recognition of  these 
rights sheds some light on these questions: first to be created 
were civil and political rights; then came economic and 
social rights; and the last to be considered worthy of  status as 
human rights were cultural rights. 
Their late recognition as fundamental rights and 
their last place incorporation into the list thereof  was not 
by chance. Even today, cultural rights continue to be an 
underdeveloped category of  human rights18.
“The dogmatics of  fundamental rights in the 
strict sense and of  human rights in the general sense 
allow us to differentiate, as the United Nations Covenants 
did paradigmatically in 1966, between: ‘first generation’ 
rights, especially civil rights and ‘second generation’ rights 
(economic, social and cultural rights). This is done through 
the historic-political origin (and ideological roots), the state 
model (liberal state/social state) and economic/civil society 
relations. Regarding the rights themselves, the difference is 
found through their individual/collective nature (entitlement 
and conditions for exercise), logic structure (negative rights/
positive rights) and their object:    the negative and positive 
obligations that define them (state subject to the infringement 
of  rights, state which confers reinstating guardianship of  the 
right, compensating the subjects or another ideal, and the 
state obliged to provide social satisfaction to those in need, 
conceived as collectives of  individuals). Nonetheless, this 
differentiation, as based on factors such as historic origin, state 
model, nature, logic structure and subject/object of  negative 
and positive obligations, is typological and formalist, as is 
the notion of  ‘generations of  rights.’ The latter is a source 
of  too many simplifications and therefore its dogmatic use 
must be employed with due caution and whilst recognising 
the important nuances that a dogmatic analysis imposes.19”
In any case, according to Prieto de Pedro: “It is of  no 
surprise that an accomplished author such as Symonides has 
titled his recent work ‘Cultural Rights, a Neglected Category 
of  Human Rights,’ or that the Fribourg Group, responsible 
for creating and presenting a convention on cultural rights 
to UNESCO would title their work ‘Cultural Rights, an 
Underdeveloped Category of  Human Rights’.”
The Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (1948), 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) affirm that it is impossible to realise the ideal of  
a free human who is freed from fear and misery. This is unless 
conditions are created to enable each person to enjoy their 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.
Similarly, the 1993 Vienna World Conference on 
Rights and the Declaration and Programme of  Action that 
it approved reaffirmed that all human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and related to one another. 
They also stated that the international community must treat 
human rights globally, justly and equally, based on equality 
and giving them all the same weight.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of  Treaties (Vienna, 1998): “A treaty [the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of  the treaty in their context and in the 
light of  its object and purpose.”
Although, according to some, the full effectiveness 
of  the rights recognised in the Covenant is achieved 
progressively: “The application of  some of  those rights may 
be made justiciable immediately, while other rights may be 
made justiciable with the passage of  time.20”
Although it is true that civil and political rights have 
garnered more consideration by the international community, 
to the point that ESCRs are often considered as second class 
rights, as inapplicable and not subject to the courts, given 
that they can only be made effective “progressively” over 
a period of  time that cannot be determined precisely; this 
affirmation is erroneous seeing as in some ways ESCRs are 
more relevant than civil and political rights and are nowadays 
given preferential consideration.
To quote Resolution 32/130 of  the 16th of  December 
1977, of  the General Assembly of  the United Nations:
a) All human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
indivisible and interdependent: equal attention and urgent 
consideration should be given to the implementation, 
promotion and protection of  both civil and political, and 
economic, social and cultural rights;
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b) The full realisation of  civil and political rights 
without the enjoyment of  economic, social and cultural 
rights is impossible; “the achievement of  lasting progress in 
the implementation of  human rights is dependent on sound 
and effective national and international policies of  economic 
and social development,” as recognised in the Proclamation 
of  Tehran in 1968. 
As affirmed in the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights and in accordance with the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights: “The indivisibility and interdependence of  
civil and political rights and of  economic, social and cultural 
rights are fundamental principles in the international 
legislation of  human rights.”
Therefore, what should be asked is not only whether 
ESCRs are basic human rights but also to what they give 
a right to and what is the legal character of  the states’ 
obligations to make them effective.
To summarise, the objective of  ESCRs is to ensure the 
full protection of  people, based on said persons being able to 
enjoy rights, freedoms and social justice simultaneously.
As Prieto de Pedro explains: “’Rights’ mean powers 
recognised by the legal system and guaranteed by the 
judiciary and other means of  guardianship, in order to satisfy 
interests that are worth defending and the protection of  the 
state. In the case of  cultural rights, we are not addressing 
common, subjective and always general rights. To the 
contrary, we are referring to singular and fundamental 
rights, higher legal powers, especially protected by a 
system of  guarantees that do not benefit from the ordinary 
subjective rights defined as human rights. Amongst these 
guarantees we find constitutional guarantees, compared to 
the reform of  texts and in the interpretation of  the text of  
the constitution itself,” which is reserved for the jurisdiction 
of  the Constitutional Court.
Likewise, fundamental rights enjoy a series of  
exorbitant jurisdictional guarantees of  protection which 
the legal system dispenses for rights which do not have this 
consideration: they are subject to constitutional protection 
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– which is supported by summary, privileged and urgent 
procedures – and they are affirmed as primary values and 
objectives of  the state, which should serve as a guide for the 
acts of  all the public powers. Similarly, the Ombudsman, 
defined in Spain as the High Commissioner of  the 
Parliament, responsible for defending the fundamental rights 
and civil liberties of  citizens by monitoring the activity of  the 
Administration and public authorities, constitutes another 
guarantee that only operates in relation to these rights and 
their possible infringement by the public powers.
Any citizen can turn to an Ombudsman and request 
their intervention, free of  charge, in the investigation of  any, 
presumably irregular, action of  the public administration or 
its agents. They can also officially intervene in cases of  which 
they are made aware, even if  no complaint has been made. 
A bit of history
As seen in the foregoing, the historic context which 
gave rise to the gradual recognition in international spheres 
of  the successive generations of  rights explains the motives 
which lead to their proclamation, conception and subsequent 
development: the approval of  the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights. This took place in 1948 after the Second World 
War and the creation of  the United Nations as a result of  the 
international community’s commitment to never allowing 
more atrocities such those which occurred in said conflict. 
Faced with the terrible fundamental human rights 
violations which took place in the two world wars, there 
was an affirmation that said rights should be the object of  
international protection. In very little time, the international 
community understood that, in order to achieve the full 
effectiveness of  civil and political rights, it was necessary to 
guarantee citizens a life of  dignity, via the recognition and 
promotion of  economic, social and cultural rights. 
However, two categories of  rights were outlined 
and since then they have remained as two independent 
categories, with civil and political rights keeping their place 
of  privilege as if  their respect and effectiveness came about 
as an inevitable consequence of  the efficiency of  the others.
Similarly, the legal construction on which both 
categories of  rights were built rests on different foundations. 
Civil and political rights implied the state’s duty to abstain 
and were of  immediate application, whilst economic, social 
and cultural rights implied the state’s active participation and 
were designed for progressive application. 
It seems clear that that initial difference, explicable in 
a liberal context which advocated the least amount of  state 
intervention in public matters, was no longer defendable, 
since the effectiveness of  both categories of  rights required 
the adoption of  positive measures – either laws or active 
policies – which did not impede and, what’s more, made 
possible the free exercise of  rights.
On the other hand, the affirmation of  ESCRs as 
rights that are not complete in themselves, nor constitutive 
of  authentic powers that may help citizens immediately, but 
rather as programmatic, non-subjective rights which must 
inspire the public powers to take action in their legal activity 
and in the adoption of  public policies, greatly weakens 
their effectiveness, although not their status as fundamental 
rights. Nonetheless, nor does it seem acceptable to follow 
the theory that maintains that while freedoms are made 
fully legal in the constitution, i.e. formulated and protected 
as immediately applicable rights, social rights (among which 
are cultural and economic rights) can only be included 
“programmatically, but they do not acquire a positive legal 
nature until they are developed through legislation, seeing 
as compared constitutional law offers numerous examples 
of  social rights whose effectiveness does not require [for 
their immediate enforceability] legislative integration. 
In Italy for example, the right to equal pay has not been 
generally considered by jurisprudence as immediately 
founded on Article 36 of  the Constitution, insofar as the 
rights of  freedom also very often require the intervention of  
a legislator to be directly enforceable and, consequentially, 
to have full guarantee.21”
In any case, the inclusion of  ESCRs in constitutional 
texts has not lead to the establishment of  effective legal 
mechanisms for their material realisation.
“The State of  Law supposes the limitation of  
the state’s power by the law itself, the control of  the state 
powers, the protection and defence of  fundamental rights 
and freedoms, all of  which is oriented at the protection of  
individuals from the arbitrariness of  the administration.” 
Liberal states consecrated a principle of  equality, 
this being understood as the legal, merely formal equality 
of  citizens in the eyes of  the law. This concept was refuted 
by social states when they legally consecrated equality, not 
only in terms of  legality but also in its material aspect. 
Furthermore, the affirmation of  a social and democratic 
state involves “the public powers assuming responsibility for 
providing the general public with the provisions and public 
services needed to defray their vital necessities, i.e. they cover 
that which German doctrine has qualified as a universal cure 
(Daseinvorsorge)22. 
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Following the reflection of  Professor Gregorio Peces-
Barba, ESCRs are “fundamental rights due to the ultimate 
finality they are given and not for the way in which they are 
deployed in reality.23” 
Regarding the foregoing and in terms of  the 
differing guardianship recognised for civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural 
rights, on the other: it has been maintained that “while 
the rights of  freedom directly benefit from constitutional 
guardianship, social rights cannot be the immediate object 
of  such guardianship.24” This affirmation, as we have seen 
previously, is not necessarily true or inevitable as there is still 
the jurisdictional body that is responsible for guaranteeing 
fundamental rights, considering that their formulation in the 
text of  the constitution is sufficient founding for their legal 
guardianship and to justify the declaration that all provisions 
that ignore or infringe them are unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, cultural rights, as delimited by the 
adjective ‘cultural,’ conflict, first of  all, with the diverse 
notions of  what culture is, thus conditioning their scope: 
therefore one notion is restricted to minorities and the other 
implies that they are rights that affect all citizens. This is a 
distinction of  enormous transcendence, since “the nature of  
universality is put forward as a deontological condition of  
human rights but not of  fundamental rights.25” 
Following the explanation by Prieto de Pedro: “The 
first legal provisions in international spheres came from 
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, which featured them in their broad 
and open sense. However, the immediate development 
those rights have undergone has limited them to minority 
groups which claim a situation of  weakness compared to the 
majority group. This is one of  the great errors we are facing 
at this time. It is a dead-end resulting from having accepted 
a proposal which defines cultural rights as a concession to 
minorities over the majorities, when cultural rights form part 
of  the heritage of  all mankind. 
For this reason, I propose an understanding of  cultural 
rights as rights which guarantee the free, equal and fraternal 
development of  human beings in that singular capacity we 
have to be able to symbolise and create meanings of  life that 
we can communicate to others.26”
With regard to the historic process of  the recognition 
and legislation of  human rights, the same author refers to 
how “the evolution of  the formulation of  human rights was 
characterised by an uninterrupted chain of  construction of  
rights. From the constitutions of  the beginning of  the 19th 
century until today, three generations of  fundamental rights 
have been recognised: the first generation, formed of  the 
fundamental rights of  freedom; the second, with the rights 
of  equality; and the third containing the fundamental rights 
of  solidarity. All of  which are related to the central theme of  
the French revolution: ‘liberté, égalité et fraternité’.”
The fundamental rights of  freedom are linked with 
the autonomy of  the individual. Liberty signifies autonomy 
because it creates areas of  resistance into which the public 
powers cannot enter. The individual is afforded a sphere 
of  immunity in which to exercise their freedom without 
interference from the powers that be. This occurs in the case 
of  the freedoms of  expression, association, conscience and 
religion.
The second generation of  rights are economic, social 
and cultural rights. Unlike the previous ones, these do not 
involve the public powers remaining on the margins and 
respecting the circle of  power which the right grants to the 
individual. Indeed, precisely the opposite occurs: powers must 
commit to the development of  the equality of  individuals 
by offering services and benefits. These include the rights to 
education, health and culture, which take their shape from 
the provision of  cultural services and the institutionalisation 
of  culture.”
Professor Prieto also refers to how Eleanor Roosevelt, 
who presided the United Nations Commission of  Human 
Rights during the creation of  the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights, brilliantly expressed the close link that makes 
civil and political rights and ESCRs interdependent, when 
she affirmed: “Necessitous men are not free men.”
The third generation saw the appearance of  the 
rights of  solidarity which protect diffuse interests such as the 
environment, consumer rights, the right to peace and also 
group rights which include the right to an identity. 
“Despite the fact that only the second category refers 
explicitly to cultural rights, this classification makes their 
complexity clear, seeing as they contain elements of  each of  
the category. For example, in the first we include the freedom 
of  cultural creation, artistic freedom, scientific freedom, 
cultural communication, the freedom to communicate 
the expressions created in culture, etcetera. The so-called 
right of  access to culture is a typical second generation 
right because to access culture one needs provisions related 
to large public services (museums, archives and libraries, 
which are instruments for the realisation of  the right to the 
provision of  access to culture). Similarly, the third generation 
presents, in the form of  the right to cultural heritage, the 
112
right to the conservation of  cultural memory and the rights 
to develop the identity of  an ethnic group and of  different 
cultural groups.27”
Similarly and as we have seen previously, cultural 
rights often find approval as a necessary dimension for a full 
and effective protection of  civil and political rights.
In turn, the International Commission of  Jurists28 
(icj.org) has constantly recognised that “ESCRs must be 
considered with the same gravity as that with which civil 
and political rights are treated. ESCRs have formed part of  
the language of  international human rights at least since the 
adoption of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948. However, compared to civil and political 
rights, considerably less attention has been paid to the need 
to develop the contents of  ESCRs and they have been given 
less protection mechanisms to make them effective.”
In its second report on Courts and Legal Enforcement 
of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Commission 
affirms that: “These gaps in the international human rights 
system came about for political and not for legal reasons.
To a great extent, the cause of  these gaps was the 
prominence accorded by Western countries to civil and 
political rights, in the context of  the cold war divide. As 
a consequence, the notion of  the justiciability of  ESC 
rights has been neglected and largely ignored. The term 
‘justiciability’ means that people who claim to be victims of  
violations of  these rights are able to file a complaint before 
an independent and impartial body, to request adequate 
remedies if  a violation has been found to have occurred or to 
be likely to occur, and to have any remedy enforced.29”
If  civil and political rights and ESCRs wish to be 
considered on equal footing, it is crucial to close the breach 
between the justiciability of  the two types. With this purpose, 
the cited study illustrates with numerous examples that ESCRs 
are susceptible to legal protection, as demonstrated to varying 
degrees by the practice of  many courts throughout the world.
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